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THE DUELING FIRST AMENDMENTS: GOVERNMENT AS
FUNDER, AS SPEAKER, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
CAROL NACKENOFF*
The public events and public speeches respondents seek to
call in question are part of the open discussion essential to
democratic self-government.  The Executive Branch should
be free, as a general matter, to discover new ideas, to under-
stand pressing public demands, and to find creative re-
sponses to address governmental concerns.  The exchange of
ideas between and among the State and Federal Govern-
ments and their manifold, diverse constituencies sustains a
free society.1
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently been exhib-
iting a good deal of deference to other branches of the federal gov-
ernment in arenas in which government speech is held to be taking
place.  Government speech can include selective funding with tax dol-
lars.  This Essay will contend that an expansion of the government
speech doctrine is likely to have a significant impact on Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. The Supreme Court may be poised to return a
number of Establishment Clause challenges to the political process.
I. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRING OPINION IN HEIN V. FREEDOM
FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION: HARBINGER OF THINGS TO
COME?
Posing the question of standing in the 2007 Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Foundation case as an issue of interfering with dialogue and
with the free exchange of ideas and information between the Execu-
tive Branch of the federal government and its constituencies, Justice
Kennedy provided the fifth vote to deny standing to members of the
Copyright  2009 by Carol Nackenoff.
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lege, where she teaches constitutional law, American politics, and environmental policy.
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1. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 616 (2007) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
132
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-1\MLR110.txt unknown Seq: 2 25-NOV-09 9:46
2009] THE DUELING FIRST AMENDMENTS 133
Freedom From Religion Foundation.2  That the Freedom From Relig-
ion Foundation lacked standing to raise its Establishment Clause chal-
lenge appears to be settled.3  What more we know from Hein is quite
uncertain.  This uncertainty includes and extends beyond the fate of
taxpayer challenges against the use of public funds in support of relig-
ion.  The Hein decision also raises questions about what latitude gov-
ernment enjoys, as a speaker and funder with ideas, in the face of
Establishment Clause challenges.
The 2009 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum4 decision, “litigated in the
shadow of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause,”5 made the
question of the government’s latitude in the face of Establishment
Clause challenges even more pronounced.  As Justice Souter point-
edly remarked in his concurrence in Summum, “[t]he interaction be-
tween the ‘government speech doctrine’ and Establishment Clause
principles has not . . . begun to be worked out.”6  After one post-Hein
Court Term, what do we know about when government-funded
speech enters the arena of Establishment Clause case law?  This Essay
suggests that, with the Supreme Court of the United States using as its
vehicle an expanding conception of government speech, major
changes involving Establishment Clause jurisprudence are likely to be
on the way.  Such changes could manifest as early as the 2009 Term in
the case of Salazar v. Buono,7 an Establishment Clause case in which
standing is an issue.8
2. Id. at 592 (plurality opinion).
3. See id. at 593 (explaining that a plaintiff has standing to challenge federal legisla-
tion authorizing the use of funds that allegedly violates the Establishment Clause, but here,
the Executive Branch rather than Congress made such authorization).
4. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
5. Id. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
6. Id. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring).
7. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by 527 F.3d 758 (9th
Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).
8. Id.  The case involves a cross erected by the Veterans of Foreign Wars (“VFW”) at
the top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve as a memorial to those who died
in the First World War. Buono, 502 F.3d at 1072.  After a former employee of the Mojave
National Preserve successfully filed suit to bar permanent display of the cross, Congress
designated Sunrise Rock as a national memorial and passed a statute that barred the use of
federal funds to dismantle the VFW cross. Id. at 1073 & n.4, 1074. During the following
year, Congress conveyed the parcel on which the cross was displayed to private hands. Id.
at 1074–76.  Buono moved to bar the land swap and to enforce the order of the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, which barred display of the cross
on federal land, and the district court granted the motion. Id. at 1076.  The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, id. at 1086, and the Secretary of the Interior submitted a peti-
tion for certiorari, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (No. 08-472).
One of the questions the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide is whether Mr.
Buono, who sought redress because the public land in question is not a forum for the
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The Supreme Court is deeply divided over the proper approach
to taxpayer challenges to government spending under the Establish-
ment Clause.9  In many Establishment Clause challenges, standing is
difficult to obtain because the purported injuries are often broadly
distributed.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Flast v. Cohen,10 which
permitted taxpayer standing for an Establishment Clause challenge to
a federal statute providing aid to religious schools,11 has been limited
by later Court decisions.12  For example, it has been reread as limited
to congressional action under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Ar-
ticle I, Section 8 of the Constitution.13
Controversies in environmental law have also had an effect on the
Supreme Court’s reasoning about standing, and there is currently a
tendency to read Article III barriers to standing as posing more formi-
dable obstacles to litigants than before Justice Scalia joined the Court.
Despite protests from Justices Blackmun and O’Connor that the ma-
jority in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife14 was waging a “slash-and-burn
expedition through the law of environmental standing,”15 Justice
Scalia wrote the following for the Supreme Court:
When . . . the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or
forgone action) at issue[,] . . . there is ordinarily little ques-
tion [that he has standing] . . . . When, however . . . a plain-
tiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly
unlawful regulation (or  lack of regulation) of someone else,
much more is needed.16
display of other religious symbols, has standing. Id. at I (“Whether [Buono] has standing
to maintain this action where he has no objection to the public display of a cross, but
instead is offended that the public land on which the cross is located is not also an open
forum on which other persons might display other symbols.”).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 22–35. R
10. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
11. Id. at 88.
12. Scalia reads these limitations more broadly than some of his colleagues. See
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Element of the Separation of Powers, in VIEWS
FROM THE BENCH 200, 210–11 (Mark W. Cannon & David M. O’Brien eds., 1985) (“The
dictum of Flast has been disavowed by opinions that explicitly acknowledge that standing
and separation of powers are intimately related.”).
13. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479–82 (1982) (deciding that plaintiffs lacked standing because their
claim did not challenge congressional exercises of the power to tax and spend conferred
by Article I, Section 8).
14. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
15. Id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 561–62 (majority opinion).  This case involved citizen suits over Executive
Branch officials’ failure to enforce, or inadequate enforcement of, the Endangered Species
Act. Id. at 557–59; see also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992) (explaining that Lujan “invali-
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Otherwise, he argues, there is a risk of serious interference with exec-
utive power—a “transfer from the President to the courts” of “the
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”17  Separation of powers means
that courts should not second-guess the actions of the Executive
Branch at the behest of someone without the requisite degree of in-
jury, and congressional citizen suit provisions cannot confer standing
without this showing of plaintiff injury.18  Justice Scalia’s approach to
standing has, over the years, made it harder for litigants to cross the
threshold he claims is constitutionally imposed by Article III.
Standing for plaintiffs’ challenges to government spending or
government action under the Establishment Clause remains closely
watched and highly contentious.  In a high-profile case from 2004, Elk
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,19 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear a case in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit had held that a group of public school teachers
had violated the Establishment Clause by leading students in a recita-
tion of the Pledge of Allegiance, which contained the phrase “under
God.”20  The Supreme Court reversed the decision on the ground that
Newdow, who did not have legal custody of the child in question,
lacked standing in the case because he did not have the right to sue
on the child’s behalf as “next friend.”21
In Hein, the Supreme Court displayed its disarray over Establish-
ment Clause standing requirements.  For example, Justice Kennedy
both joined the plurality opinion of Justice Alito (in which Chief Jus-
tice Roberts also joined) and wrote his own additional concurrence.22
At the same time, he did not join Justice Scalia’s concurrence (with
Justice Thomas), which denied standing and argued that Flast should
be overturned.23  Seven Justices held that Flast, when properly under-
dates the large number of statutes in which Congress has attempted to use the ‘citizen-suit’
device as a mechanism for controlling unlawfully inadequate enforcement of the law”).
17. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3).  Sunstein argues that Jus-
tice Scalia’s turn on the doctrine of standing is simply judicially created, and that “[r]ead
for all it is worth,” Lujan could be the most important shift in standing doctrine since
World War II.  Sunstein, supra note 16, at 165–66.  It should be noted that Lujan has not R
been given this broad reading in subsequent Supreme Court decisions; however, new
blood on the Court appointed by Presidents Bush and Obama could influence the effect of
this case as precedent.
18. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–62.
19. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 9–10, 17–18.
22. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 591 (2007) (plurality
opinion); id. at 615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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stood, remained good constitutional law; of these seven, four believed
that Freedom From Religion Foundation had standing under Flast.24
But six Justices—the four dissenters plus Justices Scalia and Thomas—
could find no distinction between the Hein challenge to an Executive
Branch expenditure and challenges to Acts of Congress under the
Spending Clause.25
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the bewilderment of the dis-
senters as to “why the plurality fixates on the amount of additional dis-
cretion the Executive Branch enjoys under the law beyond the only
discretion relevant to the Establishment Clause issue: whether to
spend taxpayer funds for a purpose that is unconstitutional.”26  Justice
Scalia rejected his colleagues’ express allocation argument denying
standing:
[T]he plurality would deny standing to a taxpayer challeng-
ing the President’s disbursement to a religious organization
of a discrete appropriation that Congress had not explicitly
allocated to that purpose, even if everyone knew that Con-
gress and the President had informally negotiated that the
entire sum would be spent in that precise manner.27
Additionally, for Justice Scalia, the “Psychic Injury” approach to
standing for purported Establishment Clause violations is nonsense.28
The danger, Justice Scalia argued, is “a future in which ideologically
motivated taxpayers could ‘roam the country in search of governmen-
tal wrongdoing and . . . reveal their discoveries in federal court,’ trans-
forming those courts into ‘ombudsmen of the general welfare’ with
respect to Establishment Clause issues.”29  For Justice Scalia, the focus
on “a taxpayer’s purely psychological displeasure that his funds are
being spent in an allegedly unlawful manner”30 not only lacks the con-
24. The four Justices who believed that the plaintiff had the requisite standing under
Flast were the dissenters: Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 643 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he plurality offers no explanation of why
the factual differences between this case and Flast are material.”) (emphasis in original); id.
at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Here, the . . . plurality opinion declares that Flast does not
apply, but a search of that opinion for a suggestion that these taxpayers have any less stake
in the outcome than the taxpayers in Flast will come up empty . . . .”).
26. Id. at 631 (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 630.
28. See id. at 631 (“Respondents argue that Flast did not turn on whether Congress has
expressly allocated the funds to the allegedly unconstitutional use, and their case plainly
rests on Psychic Injury.”).
29. Id. at 632 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982)).
30. Id. at 633.
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creteness of being a “Wallet Injury,” but it merely constitutes an ideo-
logical motivation and viewpoint.31  There are no judicially cognizable
injuries, only disagreements about policy.
For Justice Souter and the dissenters, however, the “‘injury’ al-
leged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending” is “the
very ‘extract[ion] and spen[ding]’ of ‘tax money’ in aid of religion.”32
For the dissenters, claims about alleged violations of the Establish-
ment Clause occasioned by government spending decisions are not
mere ideas.  Such claims are more than “hackles of disagreement
[about] the policy supported.”33  If identifiable amounts of taxpayer
money are funding conferences that promote religion, there is a con-
crete injury—even if the amount of an individual taxpayer’s money is
miniscule.34
With the Supreme Court so divided over the proper approach to
taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause, the day may not be
far off when Justice Kennedy’s approach in Hein, with its emphasis on
“ideas,”35 comes to prevail in cases of government expenditures for
faith-based initiatives and school vouchers, which are seen as govern-
ment’s search for solutions to social problems.  After all, policies are
ideas; and now, they are also governmental speech.
II. GOVERNMENT AS SPEAKER MEETS GOVERNMENT AS SELECTIVE
FUNDER
This Essay maintains that the Supreme Court’s posture on a spe-
cific line of freedom of speech cases helps us understand and even
predict the fate of recent and upcoming Establishment Clause chal-
lenges.  If Hein’s reading of Establishment Clause standing require-
ments converges with these other First Amendment trajectories, the
Executive Branch—or Congress—could be afforded broad opportuni-
ties to rewrite the boundaries of church-state relations.
While Justice Kennedy cautioned that federal officials must make
a conscious effort to obey the Constitution even when their activities
cannot be challenged in a court of law, he was more concerned by
what the scenario would have been if standing had been granted,
31. Id. at 619, 632–33.
32. Id. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 348 (2006)).
33. Id. at 639.
34. Id. (“When executive agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money for religious
purposes, no less than when Congress authorizes the same thing, taxpayers suffer injury.”).
35. See id. at 616–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing that government should
be able to discover and exchange ideas).
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which was the possibility that the “courts would soon assume the role
of speech editors for communications issued by executive officials and
event planners for meetings they hold.”36  Accepting an excessively
broad view of standing, therefore, would entangle the federal courts
in oversight in areas in which the other branches of government
should have wide discretion.  This is hardly a new concern.37
Viewing the activities of the White House Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives as government speech38 complicates al-
ready complex Establishment Clause challenges to governmental ex-
penditures.  Justice Kennedy’s approach resonates with a set of First
Amendment precedents involving government as funder—precedents
that Justices Scalia and Thomas have already embraced and that might
readily attract Justices Roberts and Alito.  This supposition seems
more likely after Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Summum, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.39
The government-funded conferences and workshops providing
grant-writing tutorials at issue in Hein were designed for faith-based
groups, so that these groups could better access federal funds.  Execu-
tive Branch appropriations funded these groups pursuant to President
Bush’s Executive Order establishing the White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives (“Office”).  The purpose of the Of-
fice was to use federal funding to “expand the role” and “increase
[the] capacity” of religious organizations, thus coordinating a national
effort to expand opportunities for these kinds of groups.40  Such ef-
36. Id. at 617.
37. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); MARK
G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 189, 259, 301 (1983) (explaining why the Supreme
Court should not be the final arbiter of government speech); Steven Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 572–88 (1980) (exploring the Supreme Court’s general con-
fusion about governmental speech).
38. See Lauren S. Michaels, Note, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation: Sitting
This One Out—Denying Taxpayer Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Funding, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 213, 224–25 (2008) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s speech-oriented concurrence in
Hein).
39. Justice Kennedy did not join any of the concurrences in Summum, suggesting that
the potential breadth of Justice Alito’s majority opinion did not trouble him. See Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1139
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1141 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
40. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002), reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C. note
preceding  § 101 (2006).  Executive Order 13,199 was significantly amended in the early
weeks of the Obama Administration. See Exec. Order No. 13,498, 74 Fed. Reg. 6533 (Feb.
5, 2009) (rechartering the Office to ensure, inter alia, conformity with establishment and
free exercise constitutional commitments).
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forts led to increased numbers of government grants to religious
organizations.
When Hein is framed as a matter of government acting as speaker
when using taxpayer money, it reverberates with a trajectory of First
Amendment jurisprudence that has been controversial since at least
1991.41  Since Rust v. Sullivan,42 the Court has been deferential to gov-
ernment when it advances particular viewpoints with taxpayer money.
And the Court sometimes points to Rust as one of the sources of the
government speech doctrine.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Rust majority on a closely divided Court, argued the following:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, se-
lectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it be-
lieves to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way.  In so doing, the Government has
not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely
chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.43
Chief Justice Rehnquist used the same logic writing for the plurality in
United States v. American Library Ass’n, Inc.44 Congress may insist that
“‘public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were author-
ized.’”45  In this case, the plurality found that the Children’s Internet
Protection Act (“CIPA”), which requires public libraries to install fil-
tering software that blocks Internet access to obscene material and
child pornography in order to receive federal funding, did not impose
unconstitutional conditions.46  The plurality emphasized that when
the government appropriates public funds it is entitled to establish
the limits of the program for which the funds are appropriated.47
41. While the doctrine of government speech is a relatively new approach to some of
these issues, see supra note 37 for earlier scholarly treatment of the issue. R
42. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
43. Id. at 193.  Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that “when the Government appro-
priates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that pro-
gram.” Id. at 194.
44. 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 212 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 196).  Justice Kennedy, who did not join the
plurality opinion, concurred on the grounds that, absent a showing by an adult user that
libraries or librarians lacked the capacity to unblock specific sites, the restriction was war-
ranted. Id. at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
46. Id. at 198–99, 214 (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 211.  Although plaintiffs argued that CIPA forced public libraries “to surren-
der their First Amendment right to provide the public with access to constitutionally pro-
tected speech,” the Court found no need to rule on whether government entities have
such First Amendment rights. Id. at 210–11.
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By the time the Supreme Court decided Rust, it had already be-
gun to establish that government funders generally enjoyed wide lati-
tude when choosing among competing demands for public funds.
For instance, whatever right a woman has to seek an abortion, such
right poses no special obstacle to the exercise of the government’s
funding discretion.  Writing for the majority in Maher v. Roe,48 Justice
Powell noted that previous Supreme Court jurisprudence did not
limit “the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation
of public funds.”49  Based on Maher, the Rust Court determined that
the federal government’s refusal to fund programs mentioning abor-
tion as an acceptable method of family planning under Health and
Human Services rulemaking was also constitutional.50  As Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, observed in Rust, the government
“has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of another.”51
Is it possible, however, to view this approach as government ex-
penditure in furtherance of a religious viewpoint?52  I will later return
to this question as it bears on funding faith-based organizations, sug-
gesting that the issue is not as clear-cut as the Supreme Court seems to
indicate.53
If government as funder could choose to prefer live childbirth
over abortion with taxpayer dollars, government could also choose to
require the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) to take into
account “‘general standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public’” when awarding grant
money as it did in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.54  Plaintiffs,
artists who had unsuccessfully applied for NEA grants, claimed that
the restrictions in Title 20, Section 954(d)(1) of the United States
Code violated their First Amendment rights and acted as a form of
48. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
49. Id. at 474; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–17 (1980) (upholding Con-
gress’s decision to subsidize medically necessary services but not medically necessary abor-
tions because indigent women have the same choice they would have had if Congress had
not subsidized any health care costs).
50. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93.
51. Id. at 193.
52. On the inconsistent approach of the Supreme Court to selective funding, see the
provocative piece by Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and
Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991) (exploring the constitutional implications of
governmental funding policies concerning both abortion and religious education).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 88–93. R
54. 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2006)).
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viewpoint discrimination.55  Justice O’Connor and the majority re-
sponded by noting the following: (1) the language in Section
954(d)(1) was merely hortatory (as the NEA had claimed); (2) the
subjective nature of the terms “decency” and “respect” allowed for
many constitutional applications of the statute; and (3) the nature of
arts funding itself requires the NEA to make value judgments about
artistic worth, and therefore the NEA did not curtail freedom of ex-
pression since government subsidy was neither promised nor certain
in any case.56
While Justice O’Connor’s opinion avoided the hard issues in this
case, Justice Scalia did confront the issue directly in his concurrence.
Justice Scalia argued that government may establish “content- and
viewpoint-based criteria upon which grant applications are to be eval-
uated.”57  Indeed, Justice Scalia persuasively illustrated his argument
when he noted that “[i]t is the very business of government to favor
and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at least) innumera-
ble subjects—which is the main reason we have decided to elect those
who run the government, rather than save money by making their
posts hereditary.”58  At some level, he is correct: Because governmen-
tal policies do favor some values over others, government makes
choices among values.  In that sense, governmental spending deci-
sions are value decisions, and if a party wins the White House and a
majority of both Houses of Congress, it is allowed to recast policy di-
rections and values.  Justice Scalia’s observation sounds very much like
the position of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who believed that the interests
that win elections generally should have their way.  For example,
Holmes wrote to Felix Frankfurter, “I quite agree that a law should be
called good if it reflects the will of the dominant forces of the commu-
nity even if it will take us to hell.”59  So citizens express their prefer-
ences through elections, and elected leaders seek to implement the
preferences of their constituents.60
55. Id. at 577–78.
56. Id. at 580–86.
57. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., concurring).  He was joined by Justice Thomas.
58. Id. at 598.
59. ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES 58 (2000).
60. Other commentators have made clear why this simple model does not work. See,
e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY (2008) (exploring the political sources of
economic inequality); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006) (ana-
lyzing the “almost insurmountable” constitutional barriers to democracy); NOLAN MCCARTY
ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA (2006) (arguing that the increased polarization of political insti-
tutions in the United States leaves the political system unable to redress societal inequali-
ties); SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY (2006) (arguing that the structure of the
American election system frustrates the voting rights of certain citizens).
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Increasingly, the Supreme Court sees government funding as a
matter of expressing ideas and participating in speech.  The Speech
Clause is held to offer protection for speakers against government, not
to confer speech rights on government.61  Nevertheless, if government
is not a First Amendment rights-bearing entity, it has wide latitude to
speak what it will and can withstand First Amendment challenges
when plaintiffs invoke the “recently minted”62 government speech
doctrine.  That is, instead of proceeding with more traditional First
Amendment tests when a First Amendment challenge is raised against
government activity, the Supreme Court employs the government
speech doctrine to apply a level of scrutiny that is highly deferential
toward government’s articulated (or even unarticulated) purposes.
III. FROM BEEF TO MONUMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS
What happens, then, when the arguments that government quite
naturally and appropriately favors and disfavors points of view on in-
numerable subjects, and that government as speaker may advocate
with taxpayer money, encounter the expectation of neutrality toward
religion under the Establishment Clause?
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,63 the Supreme Court sug-
gested that compelled funding of government speech—in this case, a
federally funded marketing campaign promoting beef—raises no First
Amendment concerns.64  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, argued
that “[c]itizens may challenge compelled support of private speech,
but have no First Amendment right not to fund government
speech.”65  In his dissent, however, Justice Kennedy insisted that the
speech at issue could not “meaningfully be considered government
speech at all.”66  Similarly, Justice Souter argued that the government
must own the message as government property; “[o]therwise there is
no check whatever on government’s power to compel special speech
61. See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1637,
1638 (2006) (“[T]he Speech Clause is typically understood as a bulwark of protection
against—rather than a source of rights for—government.”).
62. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).  In Summum, Justice Stevens argued that “[t]o date, [the Court’s] decisions relying
on the recently minted government speech doctrine to uphold government action have
been few and, in my view, of doubtful merit.” Id. Justice Souter also described the govern-
ment speech doctrine as “recently minted” in his separate concurrence. Id. at 1141 (Sou-
ter, J., concurring in the judgment).
63. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
64. Id. at 559 (“We have generally assumed, though not yet squarely held, that com-
pelled funding of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.”).
65. Id. at 562.
66. Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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subsidies.”67  Thus, Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Souter’s objections
are that it is not plausible, in a case of targeted taxation, for govern-
ment to claim the speech as its own.  Only when government speaks
properly in its own name can it exercise so much latitude.
The current Supreme Court’s posture seems to be that govern-
ment as speaker can say what it wishes—with a few caveats.  Justice
Alito’s majority opinion in Summum pulls together the current wisdom
on government speech nicely: “The Free Speech Clause restricts gov-
ernment regulation of private speech; it does not regulate govern-
ment speech.”68  Therefore, a government entity “ ‘is entitled to say
what it wishes’”69 and “to select the views that it wants to express.”70
Invoking Justice Scalia’s concurrence in National Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, Justice Alito wrote that “ ‘[i]t is the very business of govern-
ment to favor and disfavor points of view.’”71  The Summum Court also
invoked Johanns: “[W]here the government controls the message, ‘it is
not precluded from relying on the government-speech doctrine
merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources.’”72  That is, when government “‘enlists private entities to con-
vey its own message,’”73 government is free to advocate—so long as it
comports with the Establishment Clause (as if there is clear agreement
on what it means to comport).74  Justice Alito adds that “[t]he involve-
ment of public officials in advocacy may be limited by law, regulation,
or practice,”75 so that, for instance, if Congress spoke clearly, Execu-
tive Branch officials might be barred from particular kinds of advo-
cacy with public monies.76  Apart from these limitations, matters are
in the hands of the electorate.77
67. Id. at 571 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy joined this dissent.  For these
dissenters, the “government may not force targeted individuals to pay for others to speak.”
Id. at 573.
68. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
69. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229
(2000)).
70. Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998)).
71. Id. (quoting Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
72. Id. (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562).
73. Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)).
74. See id. at 1131–32.
75. Id. at 1132.
76. It is not clear to me what barriers erected through historical practice would with-
stand the government speech doctrine.
77. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (“‘If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later
could espouse some different or contrary position.’” (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000))).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-1\MLR110.txt unknown Seq: 13 25-NOV-09 9:46
144 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:132
Government funding that crosses boundaries previously erected
or suggested by Establishment Clause precedent seems now to be
treated as the nearly uncontestable privilege of government as
speaker.  Justice Kennedy would seem to believe that, in Summum, Jus-
tice Alito correctly designated government as the proper speaker since
he neither concurred nor dissented.
One can only wonder whether, after Summum, we are all post-
structuralists now.  Did Justice Alito manage to get every member of
the Supreme Court except Justice Souter to join in the Summum opin-
ion only by multiplying the plausible meanings of a Ten Command-
ments monument erected by the Fraternal Order of Eagles?
Comparing the monument in question in Summum to the Greco-Ro-
man mosaic of the word “Imagine,” erected in Central Park in mem-
ory of John Lennon, and quoting the lyrics of Lennon’s song in full,78
Justice Alito asks a question: What is the message?  He argues the
following:
[T]ext-based monuments are almost certain to evoke differ-
ent thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different ob-
servers, and the effect of monuments that do not contain
text is likely to be even more variable. . . .
Contrary to respondent’s apparent belief, it frequently is
not possible to identify a single “message” that is conveyed by
an object or structure, and consequently, the thoughts or
sentiments expressed by a government entity that accepts
and displays such an object may be quite different from
those of either its creator or its donor.79
Only by escaping the possibility that government has a message,
or that government has agreed to convey some donor messages but
not others, does the Court appear to dispose of “the legitimate con-
cern that the government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge
for favoring certain private speakers over others based on view-
point.”80  It seems quite curious that if monuments have multiple
78. Id. at 1135 & n.2 (quoting JOHN LENNON, Imagine, on IMAGINE (Apple Records
1971)).
79. Id. at 1135–36.
80. Id. at 1134.  In Van Orden v. Perry, Justice Breyer notes in his concurrence that the
Fraternal Order of Eagles, “a private civic (and primarily secular) organization, while inter-
ested in the religious aspect of the Ten Commandments, sought to highlight the Com-
mandments’ role in shaping civic morality as part of that organization’s efforts to combat
juvenile delinquency.”  545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
As noted by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Summum, the monument at issue in
Summum was approximately the same vintage. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139–40 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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messages and monuments’ texts convey multiple messages not depen-
dent on the author, the artist, the donor, or the government, that
something similar could not be said of other texts—say, the
Constitution.81
The irreducible Establishment Clause barrier to government ac-
tion as funder or legislator is that government may not establish a
national religion by law.82  Of course for most Supreme Court Justices,
the barrier has been higher than this since Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion,83 but it is no longer clear how high the barrier is, especially with
new Justices joining the Supreme Court since the death of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, the departure of Justice O’Connor, and the recent de-
parture of Justice Souter (who would uphold higher barriers than
most of his colleagues).  For Justices Scalia and Thomas, it has been
clear that “ ‘the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not
discriminate [against religion] on its face.’”84  Justice Kennedy joined
this reasoning in “upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of
groups or persons without regard to their religion.”85  If the wall of
separation ever successfully barred direct government funding of re-
ligious organizations, the requirement of neutrality as currently un-
derstood does not, and may even require government to include
religious organizations in funding programs that serve secular
purposes.
81. It would be quite remarkable if original public meaning Justices and textualists
would want to go down this (post-structuralist) road when discussing public monuments,
which is surely why Justices Scalia and Thomas make the specific point in their Summum
concurrence, embracing the late Chief Justice Rehnquist’s language in Van Orden, that the
“Ten Commandments ‘have an undeniable historical meaning’ in addition to their ‘relig-
ious significance.’” Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690 (plu-
rality opinion)).
82. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing James Madison’s views on the establishment of a national religion and arguing that
Madison did not see the First Amendment “as requiring neutrality on the part of govern-
ment between religion and irreligion”).
83. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
84. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)).
85. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“If the relig-
ious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would
conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at
the behest of the government.”).  In her concurrence in the judgment, Justice O’Connor
sparred with Justice Thomas over what she saw as his abandonment of the direct versus
indirect aid distinction and for writing an opinion of “unprecedented breadth.” Id. at 837
(O’Connor, J., concurring); cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002)
(“[O]ur decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between government programs that
provide aid directly to religious schools . . . and programs of true private choice . . . .”)
(internal citations omitted).
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What would it mean to violate the Establishment Clause using the
government speech doctrine?  The Supreme Court insists that govern-
ment is permitted to advance viewpoints when it speaks, and it looks
as if advancing “ideas,”86 such as the appropriate use of faith-based
initiatives in public programs, is protected against most Establishment
Clause challenges.  Government as funder is likewise permitted to pro-
mote specific aims, and funding these aims—as in the case of funding
conferences and workshops to encourage and to help prepare fund-
ing proposals from faith-based groups—also seems to be protected
against most Establishment Clause challenges.87
The Establishment Clause issues raised here are more compli-
cated than the current Supreme Court seems to want to consider.
When government funds faith-based initiatives, is government the
speaker?88  When government funds actors and organizations in the
“private” sector to perform tasks and services that government might
have undertaken itself—whether it be running prisons or schools,
contracting operations in Iraq, or providing community social ser-
vices—what constitutional standards govern the actions and expres-
sive activities of these entities?  Are they governmental actors, merely
private ones, or something in between?89  What kind of oversight may
government exercise, if any?
Another Establishment Clause complication is illustrated in the
matter of abortion counseling.  With parental consent provisions in
state abortion statutes, Helena Silverstein has recently documented
how judicial bypass provisions are frequently abused by members of
the bench, who may compel minors to submit to religious counseling
86. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 616–17 (2007) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
87. It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court considers money to be speech, as in
the line of cases concerning campaign expenditures. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.
230, 236–37 (2006) (plurality opinion) (finding that a Vermont statute that limited cam-
paign expenditures violated the Speech Clause); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976)
(per curiam) (“Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending
of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combi-
nation of the two.”).  Justice Kennedy has been particularly vocal in arguing that campaign
contributions are also core political speech and has insisted upon the abolition of the
distinction between contributions and expenditures. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406–10 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
88. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008) (arguing that the First Amendment should recognize a cate-
gory of mixed speech because of the problems inherent in the First Amendment’s dichoto-
mous characterization of speech as either purely private or purely governmental).
89. See id. at 608, 626–40 (noting the lack of judicial recognition for mixed speech and
suggesting a framework for analyzing issues of mixed speech).
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from pro-life evangelicals.90  She argues that judges make calculated
efforts to convey their religious views and to persuade minors to carry
fetuses to term.91  If this is not an Establishment Clause issue, is it
because the young women were not ultimately compelled to deliver
babies they wished not to have?  Or are these not Establishment
Clause issues because their cases had become moot if they could not
obtain a judicial bypass and did not or could not obtain parental con-
sent?  Although Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore’s refusal to remove
the Ten Commandments from his courtroom created high-drama Es-
tablishment Clause media coverage a few years ago,92 why are we more
concerned with stone tablets and framed displays than with the
proselytizing of minors by government officials or their surrogates?
Because judges may have outsourced some of the counseling so that it
did not take place in the courtroom, does this save religious counsel-
ing from the same kind of infirmity that doomed a nondenomina-
tional prayer at the high school graduation in Lee v. Weisman?93  In the
case of compelled pro-life counseling, is it unlikely that government-
sponsored speech, even if performed by others, represents an
establishment?
The trajectory of First Amendment jurisprudence seems to si-
lence the kinds of Establishment Clause challenges that might have
been posed by the activities of the White House Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives or by the organizations funded by the
White House under this program.  If taxpayers are ultimately barred
from having standing to challenge alleged Establishment Clause viola-
tions caused by government taxing and spending to support religion,
do the interests and prerogatives of government as speaker or govern-
ment as funder then ultimately trump the “ideological” or “psycholog-
ical” injuries of disgruntled citizens?
If few or none can conceivably raise Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to government spending programs or government speech activ-
ities, then short of government’s establishment of a national church,
the Establishment Clause could be rendered nearly as irrelevant to the
Constitution as the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  For good or ill, the Establishment Clause would then be
90. HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT MINORS
97–99 (2007).
91. Id. at 97–99, 115–16, 130.
92. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Alabama Panel Ousts Judge over Ten Commandments, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at A16 (providing background information on this event).
93. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  Are female minors who are seeking judicial bypass so very
different from impressionable students who do not want to skip their high school
graduation?
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largely left to the political process.94  The government speech doc-
trine, First Amendment case law on government as funder, and the
current reading of the Establishment Clause are combining into a per-
fect storm.  While government may not have formal speech rights, it
has enormous speaking privileges, and the Supreme Court is closing
off avenues through which citizens may make First Amendment ap-
peals against such speech or against such funding.  Indeed, when one
looks at Hein, Summum, and the Establishment Clause, it appears as if
many citizens stand to lose a First Amendment battle with the speak-
ing and funding privileges of government.
94. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)
(“When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a
particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for
its advocacy.  If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some differ-
ent or contrary position.”).
